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RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND THE 
RIGHT OF THE MENTALLY 
DISORDERED TO RECEIVE 
APPROPRIATE TREATMENT 
Sacha Wallach* 
This article explores the right of mentally disordered patients to appropriate treatment after the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.  It then examines the 
detrimental impact of resource constraints on this right, especially the undermining of the 
presumption in favour of community treatment.  It concludes that resource constraints are not an 
appropriate justification for denial of the right to appropriate treatment. 
[S]omeone always vetoes; someone normal; someone beautiful; someone blessed by normality; 
someone administering the rusty mind's rules of yesteryear; someone male - cigar-smoker 
perhaps; someone ruddy-faced with health; someone female - a skeleton in her cupboard, 
never gave a sucker an even break ... someone genuine not able to bend the rules to match the 
need; ... someone who had too many nos in their childhood; ... someone always says no.1 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is often all too easy to say "no" to those who are in a position of vulnerability.  For 
those suffering from mental illness, history bears disturbing witness to this fact.  The 
history of the treatment of the mentally ill is characterised by an abusive arrogance, 
embodied in benevolent paternalism, with an underbelly of public distrust and fear. 
Amidst all the baggage of a designation of social abnormality, the mentally disordered 
have long endured a system which has neglected their rights.  Not only the rights which 
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB (Hons) requirements at Victoria University in 
1999.  It was awarded the Robert Orr McGechan Prize in 1999 for legal writing at Victoria 
University. 
1 Christopher Nolan Under the Eye of the Clock: The Life Story of Christopher Nolan (Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, London, 1987) 12-13. 
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are shared by reason of humanity, but also specific rights which acknowledge the need to 
redress vulnerability.  Fundamental among the rights of the mentally disordered is the 
right to receive appropriate treatment.  Despite a move in the current philosophy of mental 
health legislation toward upholding the rights of patients and promoting the autonomy of 
those suffering from mental illness, the lack of resources available to support this shift 
allows the position of vulnerability of the mentally disordered to be perpetuated. 
This paper considers the right of a mentally disordered patient to treatment 
appropriate to his or her condition.  Among the issues explored is the meaning to be 
attached to "appropriate treatment"; what standard of treatment should be available; the 
question of treatability and whether treatment must have a therapeutic effect if it is to 
constitute anything other than preventive and arbitrary detention.  The paper then looks at 
the detrimental impact of resource constraint on the right to appropriate treatment, 
particularly with regard to the undermining of the presumption in favour of community 
treatment. 
The conclusion of this paper is that resource constraint is not an appropriate 
justification for denial of the right to appropriate treatment.  The law must not also be seen 
to say "no" to the mentally disordered and effective remedies must be available when a 
patient's fundamental rights are breached.  Ultimately, a principled commitment to the 
rights of the mentally disordered requires resources to be made available to uphold these 
rights.  Without adequate resources to provide appropriate treatment, the abuse of the 
vulnerable position of those suffering mental illness continues and claims to a system 
which promotes patients' rights and autonomy present a hollow and deceptive victory. 
II THE CHANGING PHILOSOPHY OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 
With the enactment of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992 (MHA92) a fundamental shift in the underlying philosophy of mental health 
treatment was introduced.  The Act explicitly pronounced concern for protecting the rights 
of the mentally disordered and for promoting patient autonomy.2  It also confirmed a 
change in the setting of mental health treatment from a hospital-based service to a 
community-based model of care.3  Pegged as the best and most cost-effective form of 
mental health care provision,4 treatment within the community was seen to give those 
  
2 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 64-75. 
3 Ministry of Health Looking Forward: Strategic Directions for the Mental Health Services (Wellington, 
June 1994) 3 [Looking Forward].  Section 28(2) of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment ) Act 1992 provides a presumption in favour of making a community treatment order 
when compulsory treatment is required. 
4 Looking Forward, above n 3, 8. 
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suffering from mental illness the freedom to lead fulfilling and productive lives.5  In-
patient services were for acute cases and for those requiring secure care.6 
Under the MHA92, the mentally disordered were also seen to be a more narrowly 
defined group than they had been when previously classed as crazy, lunatic, mad or 
mentally defective.7  As defined by the Act, "mental disorder" is evidenced by an 
abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature) characterised 
by delusions, or by disorders of mood, perception, volition or cognition.8  The definition is 
then restricted to those persons whose mental abnormality poses serious danger to the 
public or to the person themselves, or seriously diminishes the individual's capacity for 
self-care.9 
There is little concern for the use of diagnostic labels in the construction and 
application of the Act.10  Whether the legal definition of mental disorder is met will be 
influenced by medical opinion based on psychiatric history and clinical reports,11 but 
discrete psychiatric diagnosis is not fundamental to the decision whether treatment should 
occur under the Act.12  It may however, be relevant to establishing the type of treatment 
considered "appropriate" for that condition.13 
Specifically excluded from the assessment and treatment provisions of the MHA92 are 
those who might be classified as suffering an abnormal state of mind by reason only of 
their political, cultural or religious beliefs, their sexual preferences, criminal or delinquent 
  
5 Sylvia A Bell and Warren J Brookbanks Mental Health Law in New Zealand (Brooker's Ltd, 
Wellington, 1998) 183 [Mental Health Law]. 
6 Looking Forward, above n 3, 8. 
7 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 13.  Some commentators have disputed this point, suggesting that 
the definition remains broad, particularly with reference to the contentious inclusion of disorders 
of cognition and volition, vague terms in a psychiatric context.  See Jeremy Anderson "Psychiatric 
decision-making in the compulsory assessment process" in John Dawson, Jeremy Anderson and 
Stephen McCarthy (leaders) The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
(New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, February-March 1993) 50-58. 
8 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2. 
9 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2. 
10 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 1-3, 12. 
11 John Dawson "The New Mental Health Act 1992" in John Dawson, Jeremy Anderson and Stephen 
McCarthy (leaders) The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, February-March 1993) 21, para 5.10 ["The New Mental 
Health Act 1992"]. 
12 Re H [mental health] (1996) 14 FRNZ 523, 527-528 per Inglis J. 
13 Re H [mental health] above n 12, 529, 530. 
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behaviour, or substance abuse.14  These exclusions emphasise the fact that mental disorder 
"must derive from the patient themselves, rather than result from conflict with a social 
system".15  Intellectual handicap is also removed from the ambit of the Act,16 severing a 
long-standing and often contentious association between the mentally disordered and the 
intellectually disabled.17 
The philosophy underlying the MHA92 represents a positive and significant shift from 
past abusive, though often well-intentioned, social and systemic attitudes toward the 
mentally ill.  It recognises that to involuntarily detain and treat an individual constitutes a 
significant invasion of personal rights and freedoms.  The construction of "mental 
disorder" in the Act goes some way to provide a barrier to the exercise of coercive power 
in this context.  It ensures a balancing of interests that considers the seriousness of 
interfering with the liberty of a mentally disordered person against the seriousness of any 
threat posed by that individual.  Ultimately however, the Act is not directed toward the 
general promotion of good mental health but rather to the management of those whose 
dysfunction presents a social risk.18  Once a person is held to come under the ambit of the 
Act and is made subject to a compulsory treatment order, the rights provisions and other 
procedural safeguards exist to make sure that respect for the dignity and autonomy of that 
individual is maintained. 
III THE RIGHT TO APPROPRIATE TREATMENT 
With the exercise of social control comes a corresponding duty of social responsibility.  
The MHA92 provides significant powers of social control in that it allows for involuntary 
detention and treatment conducted against the wishes of the patient.  Although persons 
made subject to the provisions of the Act may present a social risk, the aim of the 
legislation is not punitive. 
The foundation of the Act is treatment, to improve the condition of an individual and 
reduce the likelihood of harm to self or others.  This endeavour requires that proper 
deference be paid to the human rights of mentally disordered patients.  The specific 
statement of rights of patients in Part VI of the MHA92 reflects this concern and 
  
14 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 4. 
15 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 23. 
16 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 4(e). 
17 Sylvia Bell "Defining Mental Disorder" in Warren Brookbanks (ed) Psychiatry and the Law: Clinical 
and Legal Issues (Brooker's Ltd, Wellington, 1996) 81 ["Defining Mental Disorder"].  The 
untreatability of intellectual handicap makes it inappropriate to include the intellectually disabled 
in the scope of legislation that has a fundamental emphasis on treatment. 
18 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 13. 
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consolidates international opinion that mental health legislation should reinforce the 
autonomy of those made subject to the powers of compulsory treatment provisions. 
Among the rights provided to those made subject to the MHA92 is the entitlement in 
section 66 "to medical treatment and other health care appropriate to [the patient's] 
condition".19  This right is a corollary to the compulsory nature of assessment and 
treatment.20  The premise on which compulsory treatment is exercised under the Act is to 
therapeutically intervene so as to improve the mentally disordered person's condition and 
quality of life and thereby reduce or eliminate the risk of self-harm or serious danger to 
others.  What is appropriate treatment in any given case would then be determined 
according to this goal.  This appears a reasonably straightforward proposition but, as with 
all dealings with the human mind, much is assumed, little is known and even less is 
understood. 
What is "appropriate treatment" for a particular mentally disordered individual will 
inevitably be decided upon by the responsible clinician,21 reviewed by a judge,22 and 
bound by the constructs of culture and time.23  These factors themselves highlight issues 
about the interpretation and application of section 66 of the Act but various other 
questions also surface when the boundaries of this right are explored.  Among these is the 
meaning to be attached to "appropriate treatment"; whether this constitutes best possible, 
best available, or reasonable, suitable and on-hand treatment; the question of treatability; 
and whether treatment must have a therapeutic effect if it is to constitute anything other 
than preventive and arbitrary detention. 
A "Appropriateness" of Treatment to the Patient's Condition 
The right in section 66 of the MHA92 provides for the patient to receive treatment 
"appropriate to his or her condition".  "Appropriate" treatment would be that which is 
clinically suitable and proper for the condition with which the patient presents.  Such a 
  
19 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 66, emphasis added. 
20 Ministry of Health, Mental Health Services Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992 (Wellington, June 1997) 32, para 19.3 [Ministry of Health Guidelines]. 
21 Ministry of Health Guidelines, above n 20, 22 - provide that the responsible clinician should 
include in their report to the Court a proposed course of treatment.  The strength of the 
responsible clinician's opinion in determining treatment is conveyed in the case of In the matter of E 
[1994] NZFLR 328, 334, where it is stated that the Court could not compel a psychiatrist to treat 
someone who is unaccepting of treatment in the way the psychiatrist thinks appropriate. 
22 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act, ss 17-18, 27-28. 
23 Mason Durie "'Te Taha Hinengaro': An Integrated Approach To Mental Health" (1984) 1 
Community Mental Health in New Zealand 5. 
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determination is limited by medical and psychiatric knowledge, but should be appropriate 
so far as is known and not subject the patient to medical or scientific experimentation.24 
The right of the detained person to be treated with "humanity and respect for the 
inherent dignity of the person",25 the right not to be subjected to "cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatment",26 and the various requirements that there be respect 
for the patient's culture and beliefs,27 add a further gloss to the determination of 
appropriateness.  Essential also in the present philosophy of mental health care is that the 
appropriateness of treatment is impacted by the setting in which it occurs and more often 
than not this should mean treatment occurs in the community. 
1 Clinical appropriateness 
In the case of Re MP,28 a complaint was brought under section 75 of the MHA92 on the 
basis that the complainant's right to appropriate treatment had been breached.  The 
woman who was subject to a compulsory treatment order under the MHA92 had been 
treated with various psychiatric drugs, including lithium carbonate, whilst she was 
pregnant.  She later miscarried.  It was argued that the prescription of lithium carbonate 
had been inappropriate to her condition, based on the body of medical theory that 
suggested the administration of lithium during pregnancy could cause defects to the 
unborn child.29 
The Tribunal found in this case that the right to appropriate treatment had not been 
breached.  The responsible clinician had given careful consideration to the use of lithium 
and was fully aware of its potential implications when administered to a pregnant 
individual.  It was said that: "From a clinical perspective he was appropriately cautious in 
introducing Lithium".30  It had also been found that there was nothing to indicate that the 
  
24 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 10.  This section of the Bill of Rights provides that "Every 
person has the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without that 
person's consent".  The MHA92 should be read consistently with this right and despite authority 
under the Act to treat without consent it can not be said that experimentation is treatment 
appropriate to a patient's condition.  The very nature of experimentation is that the outcome is the 
subject of conjecture and not knowledge that could establish something as appropriate or not.  
25 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(5). 
26 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
27 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 5 and 65. 
28 Re MP [1997] NZFLR 978. 
29 Re MP, above n 28, 982, 983. 
30 Re MP, above n 28, 983. 
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prescription of lithium caused the miscarriage, the potential risk being one of heart 
abnormality to the unborn foetus.31 
This decision demonstrates the power mental health professionals have over the 
decision as to what is clinically appropriate.  Whether the prescription of lithium caused 
the miscarriage would seem to have little to do with the appropriateness or otherwise of 
the treatment.  The test as stated should require that a "medical practitioner acts in 
accordance with the practice accepted at the time by a responsible body of medical opinion 
skilled in the particular form of treatment in question".32  The medical knowledge 
available at the time advised against the prescription of lithium to a pregnant patient 
because of the high incidence of birth abnormalities associated with its use.33 
That a clinically unattributable miscarriage occurred and not the birth of a child 
suffering abnormalities fails to take away from the fact that the prescription of lithium to a 
pregnant patient appeared on the facts to be inappropriate.  Such action could also be in 
potential breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) guarantee against 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,34 and the right of every person detained under 
any enactment to be treated with humanity and respect.35 
2 Cultural appropriateness 
The powers conferred under the MHA92 should be exercised "with proper respect for 
the patient's cultural and ethnic identity, language, and religious or ethical beliefs".36  This 
includes an entitlement to receive treatment which accords with the spirit and intent of 
this statement.37 
Whether a particular treatment is "culturally appropriate" may not be fundamental to 
its appropriateness to the patient's condition as such.  It is however, a relevant 
  
31 Re MP, above n 28, 983-984. 
32 Re MP, above n 28, 982.  See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, and 
the later House of Lords decision that applied this test, F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2 
All ER 545. 
33 Harold I Kaplan and Benjamin J Sadock (eds) Synopsis of Psychiatry (7 ed, Williams & Wilkins, 
Baltimore, 1994) 872 in Re MP, above n 28, 982-983.  It is suggested that antipsychotic drugs or 
electro-convulsive therapy are preferable to lithium when treating a pregnant patient.  The 
evidence surrounding the use of lithium was presented as an undisputed fact at the hearing. 
34 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
35 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(5). 
36 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 5. 
37 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 65. 
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consideration in attempting to provide services that are consistent with the will of the 
patient so as to promote a positive therapeutic effect and to maintain a philosophy of 
respect for that individual.  Such a consideration might mean that for a Maori patient the 
use of electro-convulsive therapy would be decided against because of the tapu status of 
the head in Maori culture.38  The right to culturally appropriate treatment is also 
reinforced in the Code of Health and Disability Consumers' Rights,39 and in the United 
Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care which state that "every patient shall have the right to 
treatment suited to his or her cultural background".40 
Various inquiries into mental health services have highlighted the cultural insensitivity 
that has been present in the system in the past.41  Responding to these failures requires 
that particular attention be given to the needs of Maori and to other cultural groups who 
are over-represented in the mental health setting.42  Treatment that is "appropriate" from a 
Maori perspective would recognise the inter-related aspects of te taha wairua (spiritual 
well-being), te taha hinengaro (mental well-being), te taha whanau (family well-being) and 
te taha tinana (physical well-being).43 
The importance of recognising extended family ties and their contribution to the 
patient's well-being is acknowledged in section 5(b) of the MHA92.  The influence of this 
provision is evident in decisions such as Re PT,44 where proximity to whanau and services 
appropriate to the patient as a Maori were taken into account in considering a request for 
transfer from one facility to another.  The attempt to provide culturally appropriate 
  
38 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 151. 
39 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) 
Regulations 1996, cl 2, right 1(3). 
40 United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement 
of Mental Health Care, princ 7. 
41 See RG Gallen (chairperson) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and 
Related Matters (Government Printer, Wellington, January 1983) [The Gallen Inquiry]; KH Mason 
(chairperson) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures used in Certain Psychiatric Hospitals in 
Relation to Admission, Discharge or Release on Leave of Certain Classes of Patients (Government Printer, 
Wellington, August 1988) [The Mason Report 1988]; and JA Laurenson (committee) Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into the Death at Carrington Hospital of a Patient Manihere Mansel Watene, and 
Other Related Matters (Wellington, July 1991). 
42 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 150. 
43 The Mason Report 1988, above n 41, 227. 
44 Re PT (19 July 1995) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern Region SRT30/95. 
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services must however, be balanced with the need to ensure that the overall goal of proper 
care for a patient is not unnecessarily impeded.45 
3 Setting appropriateness - in-patient or community treatment order? 
The MHA92 acknowledges that in most cases the most appropriate setting for mental 
health care and treatment is in the community.  The Act creates a presumption in favour of 
making a community treatment order and it is only where a patient cannot be treated 
adequately in the community context that an in-patient order should be imposed.46  Such 
may be the case where outpatient care is inappropriate to the needs of the patient or the 
social circumstances of the patient are inadequate for his or her care and treatment within 
the community.47 
The emphasis put on community care reflects the underlying philosophy of the Act, 
which is directed toward encouraging patient autonomy through the use of the least 
intrusive treatment option.48  It is also consistent with an attitude that promotes the 
various rights of the patient, particularly the right to freedom of association,49 and the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained.50  In making the determination the primary focus 
should be on the needs of the patient and not the potential danger that person might pose 
to the community if released.51  Concern that the person presents such special difficulties 
would have to be dealt with by investigating whether the patient could be declared a 
restricted patient under section 54 of the MHA92.52 
An appropriate placement should also take into account the various characteristics of 
the mentally disordered individual.  It would not be appropriate to place an adolescent in 
a facility for mentally disturbed adults as this could undermine his or her treatment 
programme.53 
  
45 Ministry of Health Guidelines, above n 20, 18. 
46 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 28(2). 
47 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 28(4). 
48 Re IC [1996] NZFLR 562, 576. 
49 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 17. 
50 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 22. 
51 Mental Health Law, above n 5,192. 
52 See Re Decision 273 (13 July 1994) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Northern Region 
NRT273/94. 
53 Trapski's Family Law Vol III (Brooker's, Wellington, 1992) para MH28.06 (updated 18 August 1999).  
See Re LF (28 August 1998) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern Region 
SRT61/98. 
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B The Treatability of the Patient 
The nature of the clinical condition presented by a mentally disordered person is 
highly relevant to determining what is appropriate treatment in the circumstances.  The 
inclusion of the right to treatment appropriate to the patient's condition can be seen to 
establish a "treatability" criterion under the MHA92.54  As outlined in the Mason Report 
1988:55 
The treatability criterion is founded on the principle that no person should be hospitalised 
against his or her will who does not present a condition which is susceptible to treatment in 
hospital.  Unless the disorder of the person detained is treatable, his or her confinement is little 
more than preventive detention, as there is no prospect of benefit from treatment. 
Those who will not benefit from treatment should not then be made subject to a 
compulsory treatment order.56  At the core of this issue is the fact that "[t]o deprive a 
citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that confinement is for humane 
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very 
fundamentals of due process".57  This is true when treatment is not possible as much as 
when the provision of treatment is denied or neglected. 
One of the reasons intellectual handicap is said to have been removed from the scope 
of the MHA92 is because it constitutes the usual state of the disabled individual and as 
such, is not treatable.58  A lack of treatability may also apply to some mental disorders that 
are covered by the Act, for example, various personality disorders where it is said that 
"antisocial or maladaptive behaviour is the result of unusual personality traits rather than 
mental disturbance or malfunction".59  The inclusion of personality disorders in the 
definition of mental disorder under the MHA92 is contentious.60  The focus in the 
  
54 For a full discussion of issues pertaining to treatment and treatability see Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] AC 789, 856. 
55 The Mason Report 1988, above n 41, 222-223. 
56 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 153.  This statement is affirmed in the decision of Re RR (9 July 1993) 
unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern Region SRT 37/93 where it was said that: 
"The Act itself, read as a whole, makes it abundantly clear that a compulsory treatment order can 
only be made under the Act if the patient suffers from a condition that is treatable". 
57 Wyatt v Stickney (1971) 325 F Supp 781, 785 (ND Ala); (1972) 344 F Supp 373, 377 (ND Ala). 
58 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 153. 
59 "Defining Mental Disorder", above n 17, 82. 
60 For discussion see WJ Brookbanks "Defining Personality Disorder" [1996] MHL 87, 87-90 
["Defining Personality Disorder"]. 
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legislation on threshold indices however, directs attention to fulfilment of the relevant 
criteria under the Act rather than to the inclusion of a generic category of mental illness.61 
C Treatment 
The argument that one should not be made subject to a compulsory treatment order 
because of a lack of "treatability" is to some degree anaesthetised by the broad 
interpretation that is readily applied to "treatment".  In addition, the reality of psychiatric 
knowledge is such that treatment is often expressed in terms of maintenance or 
containment rather than improvement or cure of a condition.62 
1 The meaning of "treatment" 
Treatment is not defined in the MHA92 but it is generally accepted that it is not a 
narrow concept.63  Treatment is certainly not limited to effective drug intervention as was 
indicated in the decision of Re RR:64 
[The suggestion] that a person whose mental condition cannot be treated by drug therapy does 
not fall within the parameters of the Act is, in the view of the Tribunal, a misguided view.  It 
would mean that mental disorder would effectively be defined by the ability of pharmacists to 
invent and market treatment drugs.  It would mean that at the end of the day international 
drug companies would define mental disorder. 
In the mental health context, treatment must include "all the remedies which mental 
health professionals ... have available to them to manage mental illness".65 
In assisting the patient to achieve their best level of functioning and encouraging them 
to develop insight into their illness, discussion and counselling, social interaction and 
medication, may all be used and viewed as valid forms of treatment,66 as can exercise and 
education.67  Interventions directed at the symptoms of mental disorder, such as the tube-
  
61 See Re H [mental health], above n 12, 528-530.  Here a bulimic patient was found to be mentally 
disordered under the MHA92.  Personality disorders are capable of constituting "mental disorder" 
but are not generically classifiable as such.  In any given case it will depend on whether the 
patient's condition satisfies the relevant threshold criteria under the Act. 
62 A Eldergill Mental Health Review Tribunals: Law and Practice (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997) 
1130. 
63 See Capital Coast Health Ltd v R (1995) 13 FRNZ 294, 300; [1995] NZFLR 838, 844. 
64 Re RR, above n 56. 
65 Capital Coast Health v R, above n 63, 300; 844. 
66 Capital Coast Health v R, above n 63, 300; 844 
67 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 112. 
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feeding of an anorexic patient,68are also considered treatment as much as those aimed at 
addressing the root of the problem.69 
2 Must treatment have a beneficial effect? 
Despite significant advances in psychiatric knowledge over the last half century, the 
treatment of mental disorder continues to be characterised by uncertainty.  The intrusive 
nature of compulsory treatment under the MHA92 nevertheless requires that a patient be 
entitled to a prospect of therapeutic success that significantly outweighs the detrimental 
impact occasioned by the invasion upon their liberty and autonomy.70  What constitutes a 
"beneficial outcome" under a particular treatment regime will inevitably be shaped by the 
broad definition that is applied to "treatment". 
In general terms the desired outcome of treatment is to provide the patient with a 
"realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition",71 or to 
alleviate or prevent deterioration of the patient's condition.72 Ultimately however, the goal 
of mental health services is "recovery" which encompasses such outcomes as the reduction 
of symptoms and disability, the development of personal resourcefulness,73 the increase in 
control over and improvement of mental health and well-being and the enabling of mental 
health consumers to fully participate in society.74   
It is not necessary that in subjecting a mentally disordered person to the compulsory 
control of the MHA92 they be guaranteed "successful" treatment.75  This proposition was 
affirmed in the recent case of Re FAH:76 
Treatment must be available, the treatment given must be appropriate, there must be some 
reasonable prospect of it helping to alleviate the patient's condition, [but] there is no 
  
68 Re KB (adult) (mental patient: medical treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144, 146. 
69 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 112. 
70 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 107. 
71 Wyatt v Stickney, above n 57, 785; 374. 
72 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 153. 
73 Mental Health Commission  Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand: How Things Need to 
Be (Wellington, December 1998) 6 [Blueprint for Mental Health Services]. 
74 Blueprint for Mental Health Services, above n 73, 16. 
75 Director of Mental Health Services v RH (30 April 1998) unreported, District Court, Auckland, MH 
49/98. 
76 Re FAH [1999] NZFLR 615, 623. 
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requirement of successful treatment, a phrase which itself could be given a multiplicity of 
meanings ranging from holding deterioration in abeyance to total remission. 
Recovery for a person suffering from a mental disorder does not always mean a return 
to full health or a regaining of what might have been lost, but it does mean that the 
individual should be able to live well in spite of their illness.77  As such, treatment should 
be directed to this end. 
3 Standard of services to be available 
As an adjunct to the question of whether treatment that is appropriate should have a 
positive therapeutic effect, is the issue of the standard of services to be available to the 
person being treated under the MHA92.  Compulsory treatment under the Act should 
promote "recovery", but is it necessary that it provide the "best" likelihood of such an 
outcome? 
The MHA92 itself provides little guidance as to the level and standard of services to be 
expected.  The Ministry of Health guidelines to the Act state that the right to appropriate 
treatment means patients should be offered the same level of treatment and care that 
would be available to any other hospital patient.78  The Consumers' Rights Code frames 
this as a right to services of an "appropriate standard".79  This includes the right to have 
services provided which are consistent with the mental health consumer's needs and in a 
manner that minimises the potential harm to, and optimises the quality of life of, that 
consumer.80  It also places a duty on service providers to work in co-operation so as to 
ensure quality and continuity of services.81 
Various international agreements point to the positive duty on government agents to 
provide health care, expressing the standard to be achieved in "optimum" rather than 
"adequate" terms.  Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) recognises "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health".  The 1975 Declaration of the Rights of Disabled 
  
77 Blueprint for Mental Health Services, above n 73, 1. 
78 Ministry of Health Guidelines, above n 20, 32, para 19.3.  For example, this standard should apply 
to the treatment of health conditions unassociated with the mental disorder. 
79 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) 
Regulations 1996, cl 2, right 4. 
80 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) 
Regulations 1996, cl 2, rights 4(3) and 4(4). 
81 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) 
Regulations 1996, cl 2, right 4(5). 
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Persons, which includes mentally disordered persons, also recognises the right to receive 
"any treatment, rehabilitation, education, training and other services to develop skills and 
capabilities to the maximum",82 and the right not to be subjected to more restrictive 
conditions of residence than necessary.83  The United Nations Principles for Mental Health 
outline the standard of treatment as an absolute, it being the right "to the best available 
mental health care".84  Although it is unlikely that action could be taken to enforce these 
standards,85 domestic litigation concerning mental health issues is increasingly 
emphasising the need to consider the impact of various international instruments on the 
provision of mental health services.86 
When it comes to the standard of service provision, mental health services in New 
Zealand are fundamentally directed toward similar goals to those that have been 
internationally pronounced.  Specifically, the aim is to secure the best health care.87  What 
is aimed for and what is guaranteed are however, quite different.  The right to 
"appropriate" treatment is generally accepted as conveying something less than the 
requirement that the treatment to be provided indicate the "best" therapeutic outcome. 
This approach has been taken in the United States in cases such as Eckerhart v 
Hensley.88  Here the Court held that the patient should be guaranteed only that "treatment 
as is minimally adequate to provide him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to 
improve his mental condition".89  The fact that there is the possibility of a better 
alternative treatment does not necessarily prove that the one provided is inappropriate or 
  
82 The Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons 1975, princ 6. 
83 The Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons 1975, princ 9. 
84 United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement 
of Mental Health Care, princ 1.1. 
85 Janet McLean "Forensic Psychiatry and the Constitution" in Warren Brookbanks (ed) Psychiatry 
and the Law: Clinical and Legal Issues (Brooker's, Wellington, 1996) 119, 120-122.  Due to New 
Zealand's accession to the Optional Protocol [NZTS 1989 No 12 AJHR 1993 A 103] it may however 
be possible for a person who believes his or her rights under the ICCPR have been breached to 
take a petition to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 
86 See Innes v Wong (10 April 1996) unreported, High Court, Auckland CP152/95; Police v M (24 
April 1996) unreported, District Court, Henderson CRN5090029191.  The latter case involved a 
disability hearing under Part VII of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 where the Judge held that the 
relevant statutory discretions must be exercised "with a weather eye to the internationally 
recognised norms for the human rights of ... mentally disabled person[s]".  
87 Health and Disability Services Act 1993, s 4. 
88 Eckerhart v Hensley (1979) 475 F Supp 908 (WD Mo). 
89 Eckerhart v Hensley, above n 88, 915. 
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inadequate.90  Nevertheless, an interpretation consistent with the statutory right to 
appropriate treatment would suggest that health funding authorities have an obligation to 
provide a comprehensive range of services, for both in-patient and community-based 
care.91 
In the United Kingdom there is a statutory obligation to provide a range of after-care 
services to certain classes of patients.92  In the case of R v Ealing District Health Authority, ex 
p Fox, the relevant provision of the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) was held to impose a 
mandatory requirement on the district health authority to make practical arrangements for 
after-care prior to a person's release from committed status as a condition of the discharge 
imposed by a mental health review tribunal.93  There is no specific equivalent requirement 
in New Zealand. 
The range and standard of services to be made available to patients is inevitably 
impacted by resource constraint. The Health and Disability Services Act 1993 specifically 
contemplates the effect of economic restrictions in that it couches its stated purposes of 
securing the "best health", "best care" and "greatest independence for people with 
disabilities", with the qualifier that these aims be fulfilled only to the extent "that is 
reasonably achievable within the amount of funding provided".94  The Consumers' Right 
Code also contemplates the implications of resource constraint on the ability of providers 
to give effect to patients' rights.95  Though resource constraint may constitute a justifiable 
impediment to the degree or standard of services made available, it is questionable 
whether such a justification should hold weight against the requirement that substantively 
appropriate services be provided in meeting the right of those made subject to the MHA92 
to receive appropriate treatment. 
  
90 Rouse v Cameron (1966) 125 US App DC 366; 373 F 2d 451, 457. 
91 See Re H (16 March 1994) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern Region SRT8/94.  
In this case it was held that the regional health authority had an obligation to provide the 
necessary services.  See also Mental Health Law, above n 5, 152. 
92 Mental Health Act 1983 (UK), s 117(2). 
93 R v Ealing District Health Authority, ex p Fox [1993] 3 All ER 170, 181, 183. 
94 Health and Disability Services Act 1993, s 4(a).  The same statement of purpose also constitutes the 
Long Title of the Act. 
95 Under the Code, action by a provider is not in breach if actions taken are reasonable in light of the 
provider's resource constraints. Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 1996, cl 3(3). 
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D Preventive and Arbitrary Detention 
It has been said that "unless adequate and appropriate treatment is provided, [a] 
person's confinement [under the MHA92] amounts to little more than preventive 
detention".96  Maintaining a compulsory treatment order simply for the purposes of 
detaining a person who might otherwise pose a risk of serious danger to the public is an 
unjustifiable action.97  Without the provision of appropriate treatment, such detention, as 
well as being preventive, could also be classed as arbitrary and contrary to section 22 of 
the NZBORA.98 
Those who are categorised as mentally disordered under the MHA92 by definition 
pose a threat, either of serious danger to themselves or others, or of harm to their own 
health and safety through self-neglect.  Although detention may function to "protect a 
patient from himself or herself and to protect the public",99 the purpose for detention 
should not be directed toward punishing an individual for their potential to commit harm 
as a result of their abnormal state of mind.  This contention becomes more hazy in the case 
of special patients who are concurrently serving a criminal sentence, or with regard to 
restricted patients who may be subjected to stricter terms of detention because of the 
danger they pose to others,100 but for the ordinary patient subject to a compulsory 
treatment order "any question of punishment is entirely inappropriate".101  
Fundamentally, the exercise of compulsory powers under the Act requires legitimisation 
through the provision of appropriate treatment to those made subject to its control.102 
The issue of detention is clearly relevant in the case of in-patient care where the person 
is physically confined, but it may also be seen as applicable to a community treatment 
order.  A community treatment order requires the patient to attend a specified place and to 
accept treatment.103  Powers are also given to duly authorised officers and police called to 
  
96 Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH66.04 (updated 18 August 1999). 
97 Re RR, above n 56. 
98 The question of arbitrary detention similarly arises in relation to the denial of bail to accused 
persons because of the possibility of offending on release.  See Andrew S Butler "The Law of Bail 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Note on Gillbanks v Police" [1994] NZ Recent LR 314. 
99 McLean, above n 85, 126. 
100 McLean, above n 85, 127. 
101 Re M [1992] 1 NZLR 29, 38. 
102 Re IC, above n 48, 576.  Also see Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH30.04 (updated 18 
August 1999). 
103 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 29(1). 
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assist, to apprehend and take unco-operative patients to the required place for assessment 
and treatment, or if necessary, to return them to hospital.104  Under the Mental Health Act 
1969 the application of the NZBORA to conditions of detention was recognised as being 
relevant even where a patient was on leave in his own home.105 
The question whether arbitrary detention had occurred under the Mental Health Act 
1969 arose in the case of Re M.106  Counsel for the applicant submitted that grounds for 
indefinite detention under the Act were so lacking in specificity as to be arbitrary.107  The 
Court found however, that detention cannot be arbitrary when it is according to law and is 
within the confines of the principles that are statutorily imposed.108  In a later case by the 
same name,109 Judge McElrea pointed out that the statement that detention is not arbitrary 
if it is authorised by law is only of assistance where the law provides specific criteria for 
the exercise of power.110  In order to comply with an individual's right not to be arbitrarily 
detained the detention "must be principled, or justifiable according to objective grounds 
laid down by the law, i.e. not according to the whim or convenience of the detainer".111 
Under the present statutory regime the legal and principled justification for detention 
is to provide treatment to those who are defined as mentally disordered under the 
MHA92.  "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment 
and not mere custodial care or punishment."112  This purpose is developed further by the 
statement that the patient is entitled to appropriate treatment and by the definition of 
mental disorder, which informs of the motivation for which this power is conferred; that 
is, to remove the serious danger an individual poses to himself or herself, or to others.  
  
104 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 40, 41. 
105 Re S [1992] 1 NZLR 363, 370. 
106 Re M, above n 101. 
107 Re M, above n 101, 38, 40.  The applicant was seen as being in a worse position than if they were a 
violent criminal subject to the controls of the criminal justice system:  "In the one case a person 
who has behaved with considerable violence could be accepted as able to return to the community 
with all the potential to carry out repeat offences and a person who has never committed any 
violent offence at all should be detained indefinitely because of the potential risk assessed by 
psychiatrists." 
108 Re M, above n 101, 41, 42. 
109 Re M [1993] DCR 153. 
110 Re M, above n 109, 175. 
111 Re M, above n 109, 175. 
112 Wyatt v Stickney, above n 57, 784, 390. 
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Action based on a protective motivation however, is justified as non-arbitrary by the 
fulfilment of the purpose of treatment. 
The Law Commission has said that: "The justification [for detention] must rationally 
relate to the purpose ... Any limit on liberty should be the least restrictive alternative 
needed to achieve its purpose".113  The MHA92 should be read consistently with the 
NZBORA where possible and detention without treatment appropriate to the detained 
person's condition would not only present a situation which appears factually arbitrary, it 
would also constitute a detention inconsistent with the stated principles and the purpose 
of the MHA92 itself. 
E Summary 
Honouring the right to appropriate treatment is fundamental to the integrity with 
which action can be taken under the MHA92.  Doing so requires that a person detained for 
the purposes of treatment must first of all be treatable.  In a context where treatment is 
framed as anything from education programmes to specific drug intervention the question 
of treatability is largely subdued and a determination of what is appropriate treatment lies 
primarily in the hands of professionals.  Treatment which is provided must nevertheless 
be clinically suitable, be respectful of an individual's culture and beliefs, and must 
promote "recovery". 
To deny someone subject to the powers of the MHA92 their right to receive 
appropriate treatment perpetuates the vulnerable position of the mentally disordered and 
constitutes a serious breach of that individual's rights.  It also sustains a system which 
allows for the restraint of the liberty of an individual because of what they "might" do.  
This type of punitive approach goes against the philosophy of the MHA92.  It breaches the 
patient's entitlement to appropriate treatment and also various rights provided by the 
NZBORA, including the right not to be arbitrarily detained. 
An ongoing dilemma in seeking to provide appropriate treatment to the mentally 
disordered is the issue of resource constraint.  A lack of resources acts as a serious 
impediment, not only to providing the best possible standard of treatment, but also to 
accessing treatment which is appropriate to the patient's condition in a given case. 
  
113 New Zealand Law Commission Community Safety: Mental Health and Criminal Justice Issues Report 
No 30 (Wellington, 1994) 2. 
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V THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESOURCE CONSTRAINT ON THE RIGHT 
TO APPROPRIATE TREATMENT 
The lack of resources available for mental health treatment is a reality that has been 
highlighted by a number of reviews of mental health services.114  Resource constraint 
poses a serious and ongoing threat to the right of a patient to receive treatment 
appropriate to his or her condition.  This is an issue in relation to accessing pharmaceutical 
interventions but has particular significance in relation to the provision of community-
based treatment. 
A Access to Pharmaceuticals 
Resource constraint inevitably impacts on the availability of appropriate 
pharmaceutical intervention for mental illness.  Increasingly pharmaceutical treatments are 
being developed which achieve greater levels of acceptability because of the decrease in 
unwanted side effects that accompany therapeutic outcomes.115  The superior nature of 
these products comes however, at a higher cost than treatments developed a number of 
decades ago.116  Effective treatments also have the tendency to tap into the pool of 
potential consumers, increasing the number of individuals to be treated.117 
Provision of effective modern pharmaceuticals to those subject to compulsory 
treatment under the MHA92 could be viewed as an issue of the standard rather than the 
appropriateness of services to be available.  The line to be drawn is arguably however, a 
very fine one.  These new drugs have fewer unwanted effects,118 enable greater 
improvements in people's health and lives, and reduce the wider economic and other costs 
of severe mental disorder.119  The Mental Health Commission has stated that these "[n]ew 
anti-psychotic drugs should be prescribed for all those for whom they are clinically 
indicated."120  The right to be treated with humanity and dignity,121 and to receive the 
  
114 See Looking Forward, above n 3, 6. 
115 Wayne Miles "The Right to Treatment: Access to Pharmaceuticals" (Spring 1995) Mental Health 
News 23, 24. 
116 Miles, above n 115, 26. 
117 Miles, above n 115, 26. 
118 Miles, above n 115, 26. 
119 Blueprint for Mental Health Services, above n 73, 33.  See also Miles, above n 115, 25.  The wider 
socio-economic costs associated with mental health may include the loss of productivity of a 
mentally disordered person through to the costs that fall on families and caregivers in looking 
after such an individual. 
120 Blueprint for Mental Health Services, above n 73, 33. 
121 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(5). 
 
544 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
least intrusive treatment,122 also supports a finding that the provision of such medication 
is "appropriate" when the patient's condition indicates such a prescription, regardless of 
resource constraints. 
B Adequate Resources for Community Care? 
The impact of resource constraint is particularly significant in relation to community 
treatment.  The MHA92 creates a presumption in favour of community-based care and yet 
the "insufficient and unsuitable resources available" for the care of patients readily 
undermine this presumption.123  On a global scale the shift from institutionalised care to 
community treatment has resulted in situations where:124 
[P]atients are being transferred in large number from the hospitals which allegedly caused 
their condition to deteriorate, back into the community.  But the community rarely cares, and 
the facilities provided have proved sadly inadequate ... [highlighting] the evils of 
"incarceration" and the even greater iniquities of "decarceration" that is, the release of patients 
in large number into unprepared communities. 
For those made subject to compulsory treatment under the MHA92 this failure to 
provide adequate resources stands as a significant barrier to receiving appropriate 
treatment in the community context.125 
1 The impact of resource constraints on the presumption of community treatment 
In deciding whether to make a community treatment order the court must be satisfied 
that care and treatment appropriate to the needs of the patient are available and that the 
social circumstances of the patient are adequate for his or her care within the 
community.126  If inadequate community facilities are available then the presumption of 
community treatment is rebutted and an in-patient order must be made.127  This situation 
allows for a result which is entirely inconsistent with the right to appropriate treatment 
  
122 Re IC, above n 48, 576.  A treatment option that produces significantly less debilitating side-effects 
could certainly be seen as a less intrusive intervention. 
123 Looking Forward, above n 3, 6. 
124 Martin Roth "The Historical Background: The Past 25 Years since the Mental Health Act of 1959" 
in Martin Roth and Robert Bluglass (eds) Psychiatry, Human Rights and the Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1985) 4. 
125 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 28(2). 
126 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 28(4). 
127 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 28(2). 
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under the MHA92, this being a right to treatment appropriate to the patient's condition 
and not to the condition of the community. 
The lack of resources to support community care may also have the effect of frustrating 
mental health professionals so that they conform their clinical judgments to what is 
available rather than what is appropriate.128  A responsible clinician may then promote the 
making of an in-patient order because of their knowledge of the inadequacies of 
community facilities.  It has been argued that this phenomenon is unlikely because of the 
requirement that treatment be appropriate to the patient's needs,129 and also the suggested 
practice that the recommended treatment is identified before the court makes its order.130  
Responsible clinicians are likely however, to be well aware of the services available to 
support the patient if a community treatment order is made.131  They may also be familiar 
with the patient's social circumstances and support networks in the community.  On this 
basis it is feasible that they may propose treatment which is "appropriate in the 
circumstances", but not fundamentally "appropriate to the patient's condition". 
In the alternative, a responsible clinician may be adamant that a community treatment 
order is appropriate, but the court may then direct an in-patient order because of a lack of 
resources.  This scenario presents an anomalous situation where the responsible clinician 
could subsequently discharge the patient from hospital under section 30 of the MHA92 on 
the basis that the patient can be treated adequately as an outpatient.  This would have the 
effect of making the hearing under section 28 redundant and would allow a decision to be 
imposed that is contrary to the findings of the judicial monitoring process.132 
2 The rights of the patient as the principal concern 
There is much ambiguity over the existence or otherwise of an obligation on the part of 
health funding authorities and other purchasers of health services, to provide necessary 
services for effective community care.  It has generally been said that a definitive statement 
of a human right of the mentally ill to appropriate services is frustrated by the inability to 
  
128 Stacy E Seicshnaydre "Community Mental Health Treatment for the Mentally Ill - When does Less 
Restrictive Treatment become a Right?" (1992) 66 Tulane Law Rev 1971, 1983. 
129 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 28(4)(a) and 66. 
130 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 193.  The practice of identifying proposed treatment before the court 
makes an order is suggested in the Ministry of Health Guidelines, above n 20, 24, para 11.3. 
131 It is envisioned that a responsible clinician will contemplate the services and support available to 
meet the needs of the patient when they determine a proposed treatment plan.  See Ministry of 
Health Guidelines, above n 20, 24, para 11.3. 
132 See Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH28.12 (updated 18 August 1999). 
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require an absolute level of resources that could apply across national boundaries.133  The 
inclusion of a right to appropriate treatment in the MHA92, supported by various other 
domestic and international provisions, does however suggest, that a lack of resources 
should not justify the lack of provision of appropriate community treatment.134 
A number of decisions of the Mental Health Review Tribunal reflect an approach 
consistent with this focus on patients' rights.135  In the case of Re H,136 the Tribunal 
concluded that a lack of resources to support a community placement meant the only 
proper course was to order the patient be discharged from compulsory status.  It was said 
that: 
Treatment cannot include the prolonged detention of a patient in hospital simply because of 
the failure of the Regional Health Authority to provide other resources ... when one examines 
the issue of the health of the patient, a factor that must be taken into account is the 
psychological effect upon a patient of enduring a serious curtailment of personal liberty.  This 
may engender animosity and antagonism towards the mental health system, destroying any 
reasonable prospect of establishing a healthy therapeutic relationship between caregiver and 
care receiver. 
To allow a compulsory treatment order to continue in the circumstances was 
tantamount to condoning the improper disregard for the patient's rights because of a 
failure to provide adequate resources.  Although this approach has been viewed as 
somewhat radical,137 it accords with an attitude that has the rights of the patient as the 
principal concern.138 
On the international stage the United Nations Economic and Social Committee which 
monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
  
133 Larry Gostin "Human Rights in Mental Health" in Martin Roth and Robert Bluglass (eds) 
Psychiatry, Human Rights and the Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) 152. 
134 See Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH28.07(1) (updated 18 August 1999). 
135 See Re H, above n 91; Re PTP (29 June 1994) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Southern 
Region SRT40/94; Re AG (11 August 1995) unreported, Mental Health Review Tribunal, Northern 
Region NRT334/95. 
136 Re H, above n 91. 
137 Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH28.07(2) (updated 18 August 1999). 
138 Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MH28.07(1) (updated 18 August 1999).  This approach is 
also consistent with cases in the United States where the inadequate resources defence has been 
rejected as a justification for denial of the right to community treatment.  See for example Thomas S 
v Morrow (1986) 781 F 2d 367 (4th Cir).  The applicability of such decisions to the New Zealand 
situation has been questioned however because of the constitutional basis of these rights in the 
United States. 
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Rights has also stated that economic pressures are an unacceptable excuse for the failure to 
uphold rights such as that to health care.139  This is particularly important in the case of 
mental health patients subject to compulsory treatment, where a lack of appropriate 
treatment could constitute an arbitrary detention under the NZBORA. 
3 A practical response? 
The difficulty with the approach taken by the Tribunal in Re H is that a person who can 
be categorised as mentally disordered and in need of compulsory treatment under the 
MHA92 may then fall outside its scope because of a lack of resources.  This presents 
serious implications in regard to the implicit motivation of the Act, that is to intervene so 
as to reduce the likelihood that the person affected by mental illness will cause harm to 
himself or herself, or to others.  Non-compulsion in these circumstances may act to uphold 
in the negative the right to not receive inappropriate treatment and to guard against a 
breach of the patient's broader rights to liberty and dignity, but its practical effect is to do 
the person little good.140 
An alternative approach which is directed at this fundamental concern is evidenced in 
the decision of In the matter of E.141  In this case the implications of resource constraint 
were felt in the denial of a community treatment order.  Judge Carruthers held that the 
words used in section 28(4)(a) of the MHA92 require the Court to investigate the resources 
that are available to support a patient in the community.  He stated that: "The services 
must be there in fact and available for the proper care of the patient".142  In this case the 
lack of resources available meant that community-based treatment could not be monitored 
adequately because of staffing deficiencies.  As a result an in-patient order was made.  This 
has been seen as a logical application of the provisions of the MHA92.143  It has been said 
that:144 
If the Court is convinced that the requirements of s 27 are satisfied, and therefore compulsory 
status arises, but is not satisfied that a patient is able to be adequately treated on a community 
treatment order because the necessary resources are not available, then, with respect, it is 
difficult to see how a Review Tribunal, applying the same tests when reviewing a patient's 
  
139 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 142. 
140 Stephanie Dyhrberg "The Approach of the Mental Health Review Tribunal to Community 
Treatment Orders and Unavailable Resources" [1995] MHL 60, 61. 
141 In the matter of E, above n 21. 
142 In the matter of E, above n 21, 335. 
143 Dyhrberg, above n 140, 61. 
144 Dyhrberg, above n 140, 61 (emphasis in the original). 
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condition, could order that the patient be released from compulsory status, on the grounds that 
community treatment should be made available. 
Intervening and providing assistance of some form to those deemed mentally 
disordered under the MHA92 is seen as more important than upholding the patient's 
rights so as to deliver a rebuke to the funding authorities.145 
4 So where should the balance lie? 
The approach taken by the court in In the matter of E may represent a practical response 
to the deplorable state of community mental health care resourcing, but it does serious 
damage to the integrity of the MHA92.  When an in-patient order results because of a lack 
of resources to support appropriate community care, the patient's rights are undermined.  
Such an outcome is inconsistent not only with the right to receive appropriate treatment, 
but also to be subject to the least restrictive intervention and to be free from arbitrary 
detention. 
Judicial ambivalence to interfering in funding issues is understandable in view of the 
stretched resources of the health system,146 but should not justify a neglect of the court's 
role in upholding the patient's rights.  The anticipated effects of resource constraints 
identified by statutes such as the Health and Disability Services Act may be relevant to the 
standard of treatment that can be expected but should not justify the compulsory 
imposition of treatment that is inappropriate to the patient's condition.  Patients should 
not be detained unnecessarily because of a lack of resources.  In making an in-patient order 
because of the deficiencies of community care, the balance is tipped in favour of protecting 
the public from what the mentally disordered individual "might" do, over and above the 
rights of the patient.  This has the tendency to promote a punitive attitude toward the 
mentally ill and to perpetuate the historically vulnerable and stigmatised position of this 
group of individuals. 
C Summary 
Resource constraint acts as a serious and seemingly inevitable barrier to the patient's 
right to receive treatment appropriate to his or her condition.  This is a reality in the 
  
145 Dyhrberg, above n 140, 61. 
146 The Courts have shown a reluctance to intervene where there is a question of deciding between 
conflicting medical opinions or determining how a health authority's limited budget should be 
allocated when there are competing claims on its resources.  See for example R v Cambridge District 
Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA), and locally, Shortland v Northland Health Ltd (20 
September 1997) unreported, High Court, Auckland M75/97.  Often these decisions surround the 
provision of care to those with terminal conditions and implicitly convey value judgments about 
the worth of treating such individuals. 
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accessing of appropriate drug treatments and more particularly in relation to the 
availability of community care facilities for appropriate out-patient treatment.  Though the 
lack of available resources represents a very real impediment to upholding the rights of 
the patient, it should not be accepted as an appropriate justification for the denial of 
appropriate treatment. 
Those made subject to the intrusive powers of the MHA92 should be able to access 
pharmaceuticals which offer effective outcomes, and which have least unwanted side-
effects.  Patients should also be entitled to community-based treatment where it is 
indicated that this is appropriate for their condition.  If inappropriate treatment or 
detention are the inevitable alternatives where resources are inadequate then the integrity 
of the system comes into question and patients should not be left without an effective 
remedy. 
Complaints made under the MHA92 itself have been said to be "a notoriously circular 
and toothless remedy for an alleged breach, which may, at the end of the day, result in no 
action being taken".147  Broader avenues for relief may then need to be explored, such as a 
complaint to the Health and Disability Commissioner under the Consumers' Rights Code, 
a public law action for a breach of the NZBORA, or various private law or equitable 
remedies.148 
The right to appropriate treatment is integral to the purpose of the MHA92.  Unless 
efforts are made to recognise the importance of this right and to implement it with 
integrity then the heralded change in philosophy of mental health treatment from 
protection and control to an emphasis on patients' rights and autonomy is seriously 
undermined. 
VI CONCLUSION 
As a whole the MHA92 is said to represent a comprehensive reform of mental health 
law.149  The affirmative statement of patients' rights in the Act marks a significant 
philosophical shift from the abusive constructs of mental health "treatment" that 
dominated in the past.  Rather than being driven by fear and a motivation to control the 
mentally disordered, the Act is heralded as seeking to intervene in the least restrictive 
form and to promote recovery so that these individuals can live productive and fulfilling 
  
147 Mental Health Law, above n 5, 165. 
148 See Mental Health Law, above n 5, 165-182 for discussion of available remedies and the likelihood 
of their successful application. 
149 "The New Mental Health Act 1992", above n 11, 3, para 1.7. 
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lives in the community.  The presumption in favour of community-based treatment is 
fundamental to this endeavour. 
Among the rights provided in the MHA92 and supported by various international 
agreements and domestic enactments, the right of the patient to receive treatment 
appropriate to his or her condition is of key concern.  This right goes to the heart of the 
purpose of the MHA92, that is, to provide treatment so that concerns about the danger 
posed by a mentally disordered individual are addressed and appeased.  Without the 
provision of appropriate treatment the intrusive and coercive powers of the MHA92 
promote a punitive attitude toward the mentally disordered and perpetuate the vulnerable 
position of these individuals. 
Appropriate treatment should be clinically suitable for the person's condition, be 
respectful of an individual's culture and beliefs, and should occur in a setting that is 
consistent with the needs and characteristics of the patient.  Treatment need not guarantee 
success in the sense of cure, but should provide a therapeutic benefit, which outweighs the 
detrimental effect of the compulsory intervention.  When appropriate treatment is not 
provided to a person made subject to the Act the exercise of a compulsory treatment order 
becomes tantamount to preventive and arbitrary detention.  This is particularly relevant in 
the situation where a community treatment order is denied and supplanted with an in-
patient order simply because there is no adequate facilities to support the patient in 
community care. 
The impact of resource constraint on the integrity of the MHA92 is an issue of grave 
concern.  It poses serious threat to the recognition and observation of a patient's right to 
treatment appropriate to his or her condition.  As has been said:150 
[T]he mere enactment of "rights" related legislation, while securing the legal rights of patients 
in hospital, may be a hollow victory if, as is reported to be the case in other jurisdictions, little 
is done to enhance the social and material needs of patients either in hospital or in the local 
community. 
Ultimately, resource allocation represents a question of values and priorities.  If the 
right of a patient to receive appropriate treatment is to be accepted as a matter of priority 
then resources need to be made available so that those made subject to the provisions of 
the MHA92 can be treated with the dignity and respect to which they are entitled. 
 
 
150 Trapski's Family Law, above n 53, para MHPtVI.02(2) (updated 18 August 1999). 
